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To win friends, help the needy, avoid exploitation, or influence strangers, people must make 
decisions that are inherently uncertain. In their compelling and insightful perspective on 
resolving social uncertainty1, FeldmanHall and Shenhav (henceforth F&S) join a growing 
movement combining computational approaches with social psychological theory2. Here, we 
highlight theory and evidence suggesting important avenues for enriching their model. 
  
F&S define social uncertainty as the “degree to which a person’s uncertainty about [...] their own 
future states and actions depends on their uncertainty about the states and actions of others”. 
This is surely a central source of uncertainty in social life; further ground can be covered by 
distinguishing varieties of uncertainty that differentially influence social behaviour. For example, 
people are more selfish when they are uncertain about what outcomes their decisions will 
produce for others3, but less selfish when they are uncertain about the impact of those 
outcomes on others’ welfare4. People also intuitively distinguish between epistemic uncertainty, 
which is resolvable with additional information, and aleatory uncertainty, which arises from 
randomness and is not resolvable with additional information5. It remains to be seen whether the 
unresolvable uncertainty arising from the inherent opacity of other minds is a special form of 
aleatory uncertainty, or an entirely different species. Regardless, it is already clear that 
uncertainty does not uniformly affect social interactions. 
  
In describing how people resolve social uncertainty, F&S draw on a Bayesian framework that 
accurately characterizes not just predictions of others' behaviours6,7,8, but also people’s global 
impressions about others’ competence and moral character8. Bayesian inference provides a 
benchmark for establishing whether belief updating is “optimal” in an information-theoretic 
sense. Systematic deviations from Bayes optimality could indicate social biases arising from 
heuristics1, reveal maladaptive social psychopathologies1,9, or even identify cognitive strategies 
that are optimal in an ecological sense - for example, maintaining uncertainty about the moral 
character of badly behaving others, which can help preserve relationships in case initial bad 
impressions turn out to be mistaken8. 
  
Finally, F&S’s perspective raises an intriguing question: to what extent is social uncertainty 
aversive and thus something people wish to reduce? Much of social life involves trading off 
costs and benefits for oneself and others, and robust evidence shows that when people face 
such tradeoffs, they can find uncertainty attractive rather than aversive3,4. When uncertainty 
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conceals how self-serving decisions will affect others, people exploit this “moral wiggle room” to 
behave selfishly3,4,10, and prefer not to resolve uncertainty, even when doing so costs nothing3,4. 
In this way, uncertainty helps people preserve their moral self-image. 
  
We applaud F&S for advocating a productive and powerful inquiry into the computational 
substrates of social uncertainty. The challenge for future research will be to incorporate multiple 
varieties of uncertainty into models of social inference; to better characterize when social 
inference departs from the Bayesian ideal; and to develop new models that can illuminate when 
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